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In the literature on European history, World War I and the interwar years are often portrayed as the end of the age of liberalism. The crisis of liberalism dates back to the nineteenth century, but a er the Great War, criticism of liberalism intensified. But the interwar period also saw a number of attempts to redefine the concept. This article focuses on the Danish case of this European phenomenon. It shows how a profound crisis of bourgeois liberalism in the late nineteenth century le the concept of liberalism almost deserted in the first decades of the twentieth century, and how strong state regulation of the Danish economy during World War I was crucial for an ideologization of the rural population and their subsequent orientation toward the concept of liberalism.

Jeppe Nevers fokuserer i sin artikel "Spørgsmålets politik. Om Kari Palonen og den nyere begrebshistorie" på en række udviklinger, der ikke mindst er foregået i regi af History of Political and Social Concepts Group, hvor den finske politolog Kari Palonen har spillet en større rolle som brobygger mellem den tyske begrebshistorie og 'Cambridgeskolen' inden for intellektuel historie (bl.a. Quentin Skinner og John Pocock). Som en del heraf fremstiller Nevers Palonens greb om politik-begrebet, der består i en opløsning af dets enhedslige karakter i en række topoi – i en række forskellige idealtypiske bestemmelser, der ganske vist hele tiden finder forskellige historiske udfoldelser.

The question of the role of the state in the creation of competitive clusters and innovation systems has drawn increased attention in recent years. Drawing on Mariana Mazzucato's concept of "the entrepreneurial state," this article investigates the role of the public sector in the development of the Danish robotics cluster, a world-leading cluster for production of industrial robots that has developed after the closing of Maersk's shipyard in the city of Odense. In what ways did public programs and actors contribute to the development of this cluster? In what ways did public programs facilitate entrepreneurs, and when did they function as agents or perhaps even risk-takers? To answer these questions, this article tracks three layers of public agency: the local, the national, and the European. This article concludes that there were crucial initiatives at all three levels and that these initiatives were not coordinated, but nevertheless connected by a certainzeitgeist—the idea of public institutions taking responsibility for the competitiveness of private companies, an idea that blossomed in the period of high globalization from the late 1980s to the 2000s. In other words, what united the efforts of the public sector was not any master plan but an underlying thought collective that made the workings of "the entrepreneurial state" flexible and fit for the unpredictable nature of innovation. Thus, this article argues that industrial policy did not wither away in the age of neoliberalism but changed its form in an increasing complexity of state-market relations.

Social scientists have, since the 1990s, shown an increasing interest in the role of business actors in welfare state development, and these debates provide many opportunities for historians of the Nordic countries to contribute with their insights and findings. This special issue brings together six historical studies on the role of business in the development of the welfare states in the Nordic countries, including the role of firms as providers of company welfare as well as the activities of firms and of business interest groups to influence policies and public opinion. Two observations stand out. First, the contributions draw a picture of a gradual shift in this period from that of fundamental opposition, which often dominated up to the mid-20th century, to a more pragmatic approach of cooperation. Cooperation in policy-making co-existed with confrontation in public debate, in which business interest groups promoted alternatives to 'big government'. Second, these studies underline the value of paying attention to what Reinhart Koselleck called 'horizons of expectations'. These historical studies show how the vocabulary of the actors changed in this period, and how business interest groups not only influenced political decisions but also adapted their expectations to changes in the political context.

Drawing on examples from Danish and Norwegian history, this article traces the ideological origins of Nordic democracy. It takes as its starting point the observation that constitutional theories of democracy were rather weak in the Nordic countries until the mid-twentieth century; instead, a certain Nordic tradition of popular constitutionalism rooted in a romantic and organic idea of the people was central to the ideological foundations of Nordic democracy. This tradition developed alongside agrarian mobilization in the nineteenth century, and it remained a powerful ideological reference-point through most of the twentieth century, exercising, for instance, an influence on debates about European integration in the 1960s and 1970s. However, this tradition was gradually overlaid by more institutional understandings of democracy from the mid-twentieth century onwards, with the consequence that the direct importance of this folk'ish heritage declined towards the late twentieth century. Nevertheless, clear echoes of this heritage remain evident in some contemporary Nordic varieties of populism, as well as in references to the concept of folkestyre as the pan-Scandinavian synonym for democracy.

Historians have long been aware of the power of narratives; but they have been hesitant to analyse the production of national narratives of democracy, in which their own profession played an important role. This issue and introduction aims to insert and study the role of narratives in the history of democracy. It builds on the growing literature in both the conceptual and political history of democracy, which has stressed the importance of the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century in the coming of modern democracy, albeit in non-linear and highly contested ways and often in contrast to the retrospective teleology at work in most older histories of democracy. Therefore, from the 19th century onwards, languages and narratives of democracy developed in many countries, but it happened at different times, at different speeds, and in different forms. This issue encourages and exemplifies systematic and comparative historical analysis of how narratives of democracy were created in that context: What national narratives of democracy did, in fact, exist in specific periods and contexts? Where have these narratives come from? How were nations 'narrated' as democratic, what purposes did different narratives serve, and how did they change over time?

As one of the most influential ideas in modern European history, democracy has fundamentally reshaped not only the landscape of governance, but also social and political thought throughout the world. Democracy in Modern Europe surveys the conceptual history of democracy in modern Europe, from the Industrial Revolutions of the nineteenth century through both world wars and the rise of welfare states to the present era of the European Union. Exploring individual countries as well as regional dynamics, this volume comprises a tightly organized, comprehensive, and thoroughly up-to-date exploration of a foundational issue in European political and intellectual history